Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Freed Leasing, Inc. v. Debra K. Compton and
Edwin Compton : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen L. Johnson; Attorney for Plaintiff.
L. Benson Mabey; Murphy, Tolboe and Mabey; Attorney for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Freed Leasing, Inc. v. Compton and Compton, No. 870216.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1668

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH

SUPfcfcME

COURT

45.9

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FREED LEASING, INC.,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vsCase No. 87-0216
DEBRA K. COMPTON and
EDWIN COMPTON,
Defendants/Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from a judgment of the Second District Court of
Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page.
L. BENSON MABEY
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:
(801) 533-8505
State Bar Number: A2035
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants.
STEPHEN L. JOHNSON
633 West 500 North
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 364-7320
State Bar Number: 1730
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FREED LEASING, INC.,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-vsDEBRA K. COMPTON and
EDWIN COMPTON,

i Case No. 87-0216
]
]

Defendants/Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from a judgment of the Second District Court of
Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page.
L. BENSON MABEY
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:
(801) 533-8505
State Bar Number: A2035
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants.
STEPHEN L. JOHNSON
633 West 500 North
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 364-7320
State Bar Number: 1730
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR REHEARING

1

POINT ONE.

DISPOSITION OF THIS APPEAL IS NOT
APPROPRIATE WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION.

2

POINT TWO.

THE PAYMENT OF SALE PROCEEDS TO PLAINTIFF
WAS UNDER DURESS AND WAS NOT AN ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION.

8

POINT THREE.

THE HOMESTEAD RIGHT IS CREATED FROM
THE MOMENT OF TAKING TITLE. THE
EXEMPTION MAY BE PERFECTED BY FILING
EVEN AFTER THE CONVEYANCE BY THE
HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT. AND THE CONVEYANCE
OF THE EXEMPT INTEREST CANNOT BE
ATTACKED AS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

12

POINT FOUR.

EDWIN COMPTON IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
IN PURSUING HIS COUNTERCLAIM TO RECOVER
THE SALE PROCEEDS TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF.

13

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FREED LEASING INC.,
Plaintiff/Respondent, ]i PETITION FOR REHEARING
-vs-

]
'

DEBRA K. COMPTON and
EDWIN COMPTON,

)

Case No. 87-0216

Defendants/Appellants.

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL
This Court heard oral arguments on the appeal of this
case on May 9, 1989 and under date of May 10, 1989 issued notice
that the Court elected to dispose of the case under Rule 30(d)
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

The judgment appealed

was affirmed.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR REHEARING
Defendants\Appellants seek rehearing of this appeal on
the grounds that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended the
law or facts set forth in the following points:
POINT

ONE.

DISPOSITION

OF

THIS

APPEAL

IS

NOT

APPROPRIATE WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION.
Following oral arguments on this case, the Court elected
to affirm the lower court's judgment and to dispose of the case

2
under

Rule 30(d) R. Utah S.Ct.

This Rule seems to permit the

Court to dispose of a case without written opinion if the Court
concludes

that

the criteria

set

forth

in Rule

31(b) are

satisfied.
Rule

31 in its entirety

appears to apply only to

voluntary motions for expedited appeals, consented to by all
parties, where there are uncomplicated factual and legal issues
and the substantive rules of law are deemed settled.

If

Rule

30(d) permits the Court on its own motion to render a decision
without written opinion and without the Rule 31 required consent
of the parties, then this Rule appears to directly contradict
Rule 30(c).
Rule 30(c) does not appear to be discretionary, but
instead provides that when a judgment, decree or order is
reversed, modified, or affirmed by the Court, the reasons
therefor shall be stated concisely in writing, and filed with
the clerk.

This Rule is the embodiment of former Article VIII,

Section 25, of the Constitution of Utah, and Rule 76 U.R.C.P,
both of which contained no exception to the requirement for a
written opinion (Article VIII, repealed and reenacted without
Section 25, effective July 25, 1985; Rule 76 repealed, effective
January 1, 1985).
If the repeal of these provisions and the adoption by
this Court of Rule 30(d) was intended to give this Court
discretion

to determine when

a written

opinion

should

be

rendered, then the Court should exercise it cautiously and be
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particularly mindful of the compelling reasons for the prior
constitutional mandate.
Such reasons included the opportunity to instruct the
parties to the appeal of the rationale and reasoning for the
Court's decision and to confer the benefit of such instruction
on the public and practicing bar by the publication of such
opinion.

Certainly, of no less importance, requiring a written

opinion with the reasons stated protects the integrity of the
judicial

process

by

tending

to

dispel

any

appearance

of

impropriety in rendering a decision, e.g. by undue influence,
bias, or prejudice towards a lawyer or a law firm.
Clearly, with respect to the parties to the appeal, the
failure to set forth concise reasons for the disposition, makes
it very difficult to sensibly present a petition for rehearing
under Rule 35.

Rule 35, requires that the petition state with

particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended.

Without an

opinion, the parties are left to best guess or speculation,
since the Court has not shared its reasoning process.
This writer is not unmindful that it is the duty of the
attorney representing his client to properly

formulate and

present the issues to the Court so that a full and proper
decision can be rendered.

In this respect, Defendants' counsel

readily admits that he apparently failed.

Such failure may have

occurred because counsel relied too heavily upon the record,
including Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim and Memorandum of

4
Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (dated October 9, 1986), which more expansively briefed
the legal issues and their application to the facts.
In any event, this appeal meets the criteria of Rule
31(c) which requires a written opinion in cases raising, inter
alia, substantive constitutional issues, issues of significant
public interest, or issues of law of first impression.
The

substantive

constitutional

issue

Homestead provision, Article XXII, Section
Constitution.

This provision

is under

the

1, of the Utah

requires the

legislature to

provide by law for the selection of a homestead which may
consist of one or more parcels of land.

The legislature has

implemented the provision by enacting Section 78-23-3 U.C.A.,
which provides in pertinent part under subsection (2) that "a
homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien..." and in Section
78-23-4 U.C.A. provides a method for an individual to select and
claim a homestead by filing a declaration at any time prior to
an execution sale of the homestead interest.
attachment

of a

judgment

If prior to the

lien, the homestead

interest

is

conveyed by the owner/claimant (in this case from Debra to her
husband Edwin) —does a selection of a homestead have to be made
and a declaration filed then to perfect the claim; and if not,
when is the latest time such selection and filing must be made
to protect the interest so conveyed?
If as this

Court

has previously

held,

Sanders v.

Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah, 1978), the homestead is created and

5
exists from the time of taking title without a selection having
been made or a declaration filed; then was Plaintiff entitled to
assert a claim and cloud the title then held by Debra's husband,
Edwin Compton, even though no homestead declaration had been
filed?

If Plaintiff was so entitled, then was Debra required to

file a Declaration of Homestead, not then being a title owner of
the property, in order to protect the exempt portion she had
previously conveyed to her husband from Plaintiff's attack as a
fraudulent conveyance?
the Declaration,

In any event, since she did then file

should

either of

the

Comptons

have been

compelled to involuntarily surrender the funds resulting from
the sale of both Edwin's original interest and the exempt
interest in the home, when Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A., exempts
such sale proceeds?
The more interesting issue involved here is whether or
not Edwin Compton and/or Debra Compton should be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees under Section 78-23-13 U.C.A.
There has not been a Utah case interpreting this statute since
enactment in 1981, so it surely can be said to be one of first
impression.

If either Edwin Compton or Debra Compton was

entitled to seek injunctive relief to prevent Plaintiff from
taking the proceeds from the sale of the home, then it seems

Plaintiff didn't record a Lis Pendens, it recorded a "Notice
of Lien..." stating that Plaintiff's lien should be entered
against Debra Compton's interest in Lot 12, Holbrook Heights
(the family home). See copy appended as exhibit to Stipulated
Facts in Appellants' Brief.

6
unreasonable to deprive them of an award of attorney's fees for
choosing a more expedient and less expensive way of solving the
urgent problem and one involving less risk of losing the pending
sale

transaction

possession.

or

harming

the

innocent

purchaser

in

It is uncertain here if the Court reached this

important issue of first impression or not.
The Court's interpretation of Section 78-23-13 U.C.A.
will

necessarily

involve

significant public interest.

other

issues

in

this

case

of

A homestead claimant, like Debra

Compton, is often faced with the practical problem of needing to
sell the family home, but being unable to because the home is
encumbered by judgment liens in excess of the value of the
property.

What

procedure

homestead

claimant

purposes of a sale?

or method

to achieve

is available

a marketable

Section 78-23-3 U.C.A.:

title

to the
for the

(2) makes the

homestead exempt from judicial lien; (5) provides that when a
homestead

is conveyed by the owner, the conveyance cannot

subject the property to a lien which it would not be subject to
in the hands of the owner and upon sale of the exempt interest,
the resulting proceeds are exempt for at least a period of a
year; and,

(7) permits the claimant to reinvest in another

homestead.
The practical difficulty is whether or not the holder of
a judicial lien has any duty to remove the lien, when the
claimant desires to sell and convey, in order to comply with the
statute which says that the homestead interest is exempt from

7
judicial lien.

No reasonable solution was available in 1978

when the decision in Sanders v. Cassitv was rendered. The third
party purchaser, upon discovering that a judgment lien had
attached prior to the homestead claimant's conveyance to him,
was required to bring an action seeking declaratory relief that
the lien was not valid or enforceable as a result of the
Homestead Exemption.

The attendant expense must have been

considerable.
Since Sanders was decided, the Utah Legislature in 1981
enacted Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. which provides a remedy by
entitling the homestead claimant or the claimant's spouse, or
even a dependent to injunctive relief, damages or both to
prevent or redress a violation of the chapter and permits an
award of the costs and attorneyfs fees as well.

It seems that

the key word "prevent" and the entitlement to injunctive relief
would

seem to suggest that the legislature recognized the

difficulty of bearing enormous expense in order to protect an
exemption amount that in most circumstances is less than the
maximum allowed of $11,000.00 for a family of four ($8000.00
head of household, $2000.00 spouse, $500.00 for each dependent).
The remedial purpose will be frustrated if this Court does not
adopt a liberal view of an award of expenses.
In this case, of course, the amount in controversy,
representing the exempted homestead

interest that had been

transferred by Debra Compton to her husband, was no more than
$700.00 or $800.00. Nonetheless, there is a significant public

8
interest which should not be based upon or determined by the
amount in controversy, which undoubtedly is going to be small in
every case involving a Homestead Exemption.
Since this case should be viewed by the Court as
involving a significant public interest and certainly the first
interpretation of a remedial statute, the Court should render a
written decision and rehear and correct any misapprehensions in
the law so that the interests of justice will be properly
served.
POINT TWO.

THE PAYMENT OF SALE PROCEEDS TO PLAINTIFF

WAS UNDER DURESS AND WA8 NOT AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,
The Court may have misapprehended the legal significance
of Defendants' having first recorded the Homestead Declaration
and then instructing the title company to record the warranty
deed to the purchaser and to release the sale proceeds to
Plaintiff Freed Leasing.
Defendants did not do so to settle their claim or
otherwise create an accord and satisfaction and certainly did
not do so voluntarily to relinquish their claim.

They did so

only to prevent greater loss under circumstances where a secured
lender agreed to significantly discount its loan payoff to
facilitate the sale provided the sale was closed immediately.
This was briefed before the trial judge, who properly concluded
that there was no accord and satisfaction since the payment was
made under duress.

9
It is a general rule of common law that a person could
not recover back money he voluntarily paid with full knowledge
of all of the facts, without fraud, duress, or extortion or
menace of some form (See 66 Am Jr 2d, Restitution, Section 93).
In contrast, it also firmly established that where money or
proceeds are obtained by coercion or duress, the funds may be
recovered in an action for monies had and received because the
payment would be deemed involuntary and the law would compel
restitution (Id., Section 97).
The strict rule of common law, required that an act was
not done under coercion or duress if there was another remedy
immediately available that would provide relief to the party
(Id., Section 114).
opportunity

Thus, where the person has the time and

to relieve themselves

from

the predicament by

resorting to ordinary legal methods; but nevertheless pays the
money, the payment will be deemed voluntary and he cannot
recover it (Id., Section 114).
However, where the claim relates to the title, seizure
or detention of property, the rule has been substantially
relaxed,

so

that

the

payment

is

deemed

involuntary

if

circumstances create some hardship or serious inconvenience to
the owner of the property regardless of the availability of less
expedient and practical remedies (Id.. Section 101). A simple
example would be the choice a car owner may be faced with when
the auto repairman claims that the bill for $1,000.00 is proper
but the owner reminds the repairman that the quote was only

10
$200.00.

It is easy to see that the owner should not be

required to go to court and obtain an injunction in order to
recover the use of his car.

He may simply pay the money and

turn around and sue to recover it as improperly exacted.
The foregoing rules, of course, apply with equal or
greater force to claims constituting clouds or interference with
real property.

See Joannin v. Qgilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N.W.

217, where the court held that money paid by an owner to obtain
a release of a disputed mechanics' lien, which was paid to
enable the owner to clear the title of record so that he could
consummate a loan to be secured by the property, entitled the
owner to recover back the money as having been obtained by
duress.

See also, Greenouah v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., 531

P.2d 499 (Wyo. 1975), quoting the rule stated in Joannin v.
Qgilvie in holding that an appeal was not rendered moot where
the issue involved a disputed debt secured by real property, and
the money judgment granting foreclosure was paid during the
pendency of the appeal. The court found that payment was under
duress and to avoid the evil of unmerchantable title and did not
render the appeal moot.
In this case there was a controlling and immediate
necessity on the part of the Comptons to complete the sale of
the home so that the innocent purchasers who were then in
possession of the home would not be damaged, and so that the
arrangement for the discounted payoff with a secured lender
would

not

be

lost

frustrating

the

sale.

Under

such
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circumstances

and

after

trying

unsuccessfully

to

reach a

settlement with Plaintiff or an agreement to escrow the money,
the Comptons broke off further communications with Plaintiff,
recorded the Homestead Declaration, and directed the title
company to pay over the proceeds. There was no other affordable
and immediate legal remedy available and no other avenue of
escape from the threatened injury of Plaintiff's Notice of Lien.
Under these factual circumstances, it falls with greater
force that an accord and satisfaction was not reached.

To

establish accord and satisfaction, Plaintiff Freed Leasing had
the burden of proof and would have to do so by demonstrating the
existence of declarations "of such a clear nature as to assure
the

parties

are

aware

of

the

extent

and

scope

of

such

agreement." Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d
1276, at p. 1277 (Utah, 1980).
Comptons clearly had no intent to settle the matter for
the entire sale proceeds.

Plaintiff did not even request or

expect such a settlement, since it addressed its letter to the
title company advising it that Plaintiff would release its lien
and protect the title company against any claims if it paid
Plaintiff the entirety of the proceeds.

Comptons immediately

followed the turnover of the funds with the filing of an Answer
±

1

Presumably, Plaintiff agreed to protect the title company
against any claims that might be made by the Comptons, since
it would be hard to imagine who else they could have meant
(see letter labeled Exhibit "A", appended to Stipulation
of Facts contained in Appellants1 Brief).
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and a Counterclaim in this pending case, seeking to recover back
the proceeds wrongfully exacted under duress by Freed Leasing.
Surely under no stretch of the imagination could this constitute
a voluntary payment or an accord and satisfaction and at least
in this regard the trial judge was correct in his conclusion of
the law as applied to these facts.

POINT THREE.

THE HOMESTEAD RIGHT IS CREATED FROM THE

MOMENT OF TAKING TITLE. THE EXEMPTION MAY BE PERFECTED BY FILING
EVEN AFTER THE CONVEYANCE BY THE HOMESTEAD CLAIMANT, AND THE
CONVEYANCE OF THE EXEMPT INTEREST CANNOT BE ATTACKED AS A
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE,
Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A. states that when a homestead
is conveyed by the owner, the property, after conveyance, is not
subject to a lien that would be invalid because of the Homestead
Exemption in the hands of the claimant. This Court, in Sanders
v. Cassity, (586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978), held that the Declaration
of Homestead could be filed even after the conveyance of the
property and when the homestead claimant was no longer in title.
It is clear, therefore, that property which is
beyond the reach of the creditor due to a
homestead exemption in the debtor will still
be protected once the property is conveyed to
another.
The trial court found that the value of the
conveyed one-half interest in the subject
property was less than the statutory exemption
and that appellant produced no evidence of
record to show the value exceeded the amount
declared; therefore, the entire interest
passed to Sanders free and clear of ANY LIEN
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REPRESENTED by appellant's JUDGMENT. 586 P. 2d
423, at p. 426 (emphasis added).
It has also been established that the conveyance of a
homestead interest, even with the intent to avoid creditors and
where

no

consideration

is

received

by

the

claimant,

is

nonetheless not subject to an attack as a fraudulent conveyance.
In Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietien. et Ux. 63 Utah 321, 225 P.
598 (1924), the court stated:
A homestead cannot be made the subject of attack
by a creditor upon the ground that it was sold
or conveyed in fraud of such creditor. In the
view that creditors may not legally attack a
homestead, they have no concern in its
disposition by the claimant . . . The mere fact
the claimant may have conveyed, or may have
attempted to convey his homestead, when such
conveyance is attacked by a creditor . . . does
not prevent him from successfully claiming the
premises as a homestead. (225 P. 598, at p.
600) .
POINT FOUR.

EDWIN COMPTON IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE

REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN PURSUING HIS COUNTERCLAIM
TO RECOVER THE SALE PROCEEDS TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF,
Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. states that:
An individual or the spouse or a dependent of
the individual is entitled to injunctive
relief, damages, or both, against a creditor
or other person to prevent or redress a
violation of this chapter. A court may award
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a
party entitled to injunctive relief or
damages. (Emphasis)•
The

cloud

upon

Edwin

Compton's

title

and

the

unmarketability of such title was brought about by Plaintifffs
recordation of a Notice of Lien claiming a lien upon the
interest of Debra Compton in the family home. Debra Compton had
previously conveyed her interest bv emit

ni*i™ ***** *— «J~J

14
Compton and, as clearly demonstrated by the statutes and cases
analyzed hereinbefore, the conveyance was not subject to an
attack as a fraudulent conveyance and her interest was further
exempt from judicial lien.

Because these principals arise and

are only cognizable under the homestead exemption statutes,
Edwin Compton should be entitled, as a spouse of the claimant
who would have a right to injunctive relief, damages or both, to
also have an award of reasonable attorney's fees.
arose

no

later

than

the

time

the

Comptons

This right
filed

their

Councerclaim seeking to recover back the proceeds wrongfully
taken by Plaintiff and Plaintiff asserted its defense that they
were not so entitled.

As stated under Point One, this Court

should interpret this statute liberally to promote its remedial
purpose, and this is an appropriate occasion for doing so.
Alternatively, Edwin Compton is entitled to an award of
attorneyfs fees under Section 78-27-56 U.C.A.

As previously

briefed, at the time that Plaintiff asserted its defense to
Edwin Compton's Counterclaim, the defense was surely without
merit since Ed Compton was entitled to the return of all the
proceeds. Plaintiff's conduct preceeding and necessitating the
Counterclaim and its assertion of the defense and resistance to
returning the money, was in bad faith under the standards set
forth in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1983).
In this case, Comptons also asserted a slander of title
claim which

they

still believe was well taken because of

Plaintiff's recording of a Notice of Lien. However, the damages
that Edwin

Compton

sustained

is loss of the money taken,
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interest thereon, and the expenses (including attorney's fees)
necessitated by the action.

The only additional element of

relief that would be available under slander of title would be
punitive damages.
expected

that

Quite frankly, the Comptons had hoped and

this

matter

would

be

resolved

quickly

and

expeditiously by a motion for summary judgment that was made
before the trial court.

They guessed wrong, but they believed

the recovery of fees was more clearly available under Section
78-27-56 U.C.A.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 1989.
I hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
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